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Abstract—We describe a pre-processing correlation attack on 
an FPGA implementation of AES, protected with a random 
clocking countermeasure that exhibits complex variations in both 
the location and amplitude of the power consumption patterns of 
the AES rounds. It is demonstrated that the merged round 
patterns can be pre-processed to identify and extract the 
individual round amplitudes, enabling a successful power analysis 
attack. We show that the requirement of the random clocking 
countermeasure to provide a varying execution time between 
processing rounds can be exploited to select a sub-set of data where 
sufficient current decay has occurred, further improving the 
attack. In comparison with the countermeasure’s estimated 
security of 3 million traces from an integration attack, we show 
that through application of our proposed techniques that the 
countermeasure can now be broken with as few as 13k traces. 
Keywords—power analysis attacks; random clocking; FPGA; 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A cryptographic device consumes the majority of its current 
during the dynamic switching activity of the CMOS technology 
upon which it is built. Like any other computationally intensive 
operation, cryptography requires a significant amount of 
processing (switching) activity and therefore consumes 
measurable amounts of power, which can be acquired with low-
cost equipment such as oscilloscopes, probes and amplifiers [6]. 
Power based side-channel attacks (SCA) exploit the unintended 
leakage of key-dependent information during cryptographic 
processing to reveal the secret encryption key. The first power 
analysis attack of differential power analysis (DPA), was 
introduced in [2] and extended with electro-magnetic (EM) 
analysis in [3] and [4]. Correlation power analysis (CPA) [5], 
which uses Pearson’s sample correlation coefficient to compare 
a set of modelled versus measured power values, has been 
shown to be an extremely effective and robust method to recover 
keys from many different platforms. Subsequently there have 
been many proposals to prevent SCA by breaking the statistical 
link between the instantaneous power consumption and the key-
dependent data or operation being processed. In this work we 
examine a proposal for a random clocking countermeasure (CM) 
for FPGAs as presented in [7] and [8]. 
In comparison to lower-frequency cryptographic devices, 
such as smart cards and micro-controllers, which often complete 
individual processor instructions in a clock frequency range of 2 
MHz to 12 MHz, FPGA’s can execute the combinatorial logic 
of a round of AES in a single 1/24 MHz period [10]. At these 
higher clock frequencies we can observe changes in the power 
consumption patterns such as the merging of the previously 
distinct rounds of AES [9]. This merging is produced when the 
CMOS circuitry has not had time to fully discharge its capacitive 
store of current before starting the next round of the algorithm, 
hence re-charging of the circuitry commences. The effect is 
exploited by the CM under consideration to incorporate larger 
variations in the round peak amplitudes, alongside the 
randomization of the temporal positioning of the AES rounds. 
Our contribution is the development of a charge and decay 
modelling approach that identifies which features of the 
protected power consumption patterns relate to the individual 
rounds of the algorithm. We also exploit the necessity for the 
countermeasure to exhibit variation in execution time between 
processing rounds to identify a subset of traces that improves the 
attack further. We show that the countermeasure’s estimated 
security requirement of 3 million traces [7], to break with an 
integration attack, can be reduced to around 13k traces using our 
approach. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II the random clocking countermeasure and its effect on 
power consumption traces is examined. We then look at the 
applicability of existing attack methods. In Section III we 
introduce our charge/decay modelling attack, with experimental 
results presented in Section IV and conclusions in Section V. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Random Clocking Countermeasure 
In order for a distinguisher such as CPA [5] to operate 
successfully, it requires that the power consumption waveforms 
are sufficiently aligned with respect to one-another, such that the 
targeted operation in the encryption algorithm occurs at the same 
point in time across each of the sampled traces. Misalignments 
may be unintentionally introduced due to experimental error, 
such as through lack of a suitable triggering source, by processor 
interrupts, or through intentional countermeasures such as the 
random process interrupts proposed in [11], clock skipping in 
[1], or the random clocking CM of [7] and [8] considered here. 
The use of a random clock is an attractive countermeasure 
due to its low cost with regards area, power consumption and 
timing penalties, as well as providing for significantly increased 
resistance against DPA attacks. The randomization of the clock 
desynchronizes the point in time where the targeted operation is 
processed, as well as affecting the amplitude of the trace, which 
is also dependent on the frequency, as shown in (1). 
 𝑃𝑑𝑦𝑛 = 𝑓 ∙ 𝐶𝐿 ∙ 𝛼 ∙ 𝑉𝐷𝐷
2 
Here the dynamic power consumption 𝑃𝑑𝑦𝑛 is a function of 
the clock frequency 𝑓, the capacitive load 𝐶𝐿, the switching 
activity 𝛼, and the supply voltage of the circuit 𝑉𝐷𝐷. The 
switching activity 𝛼 refers to the number of transistors that 
change state, which itself is dependent on the data and operations 
being performed. A more detailed overview of power traces, in 
the context of SCA, can be found in [6]. 
The method of implementing random clocking in this work 
is the same as suggested in [7] and [8] and is shown in Figure 1, 
where an input clock 𝐶𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑛 is fed through digital clock 
managers 𝐷𝐶𝑀, which generate jitter free clocks at various 
phase-selectable 𝑃𝑆 outputs. A random number generator 𝑅𝑁𝐺 
is used to constantly change the selected clock by randomly 
selecting one of many phase-offset outputs from the 𝐷𝐶𝑀. 
Dedicated clock buffers are available to route the selected 𝐷𝐶𝑀 
outputs to the global and local clock distribution networks. Note 
that extra delays are introduced due to the operation of the clock 
multiplexors as explained in [7]. 
 
Figure 1: The random clocking countermeasure of [7]. 
The net result of this random clocking countermeasure can be 
observed in Figure 2, where two power traces of the protected 
implementation of AES are shown. It is evident that the traces 
have differing patterns, with variation in peak amplitudes and 
overall execution times. Note also that some of the rounds have 
become merged together, making it more difficult to separate 
and identify the individual processing rounds. This merging also 
causes a cumulative charging of the power consumption pattern.  
 
Figure 2: Power consumption traces of the implemented CM. 
B. Existing Approaches to Overcome Random Clocking 
There are some general pre-processing techniques that may 
be applied to trace data to help improve a correlation attack. An 
integrating window or comb function can be used to select a 
number of samples that are summed together to represent the net 
effect of a region of power consumption. This is essentially an 
averaging technique and therefore introduces a loss of precision 
due to the difference in the variances of the summed elements. 
The correlation coefficient value has been shown to diminish by 
√𝑙, where 𝑙 is the length of the integrating window [6]. The 
integration approach is therefore best suited to smaller regions 
of misalignment. 
Another approach is to perform the attack in the frequency 
domain [12], however discrete Fourier transform (DFT) based 
approaches operate best when the windowing region can be 
minimized around the region of interest, as examined in [13]. 
Phase-only correlation was suggested in [14], where the 
differences in phase values are used as a realignment vector. The 
data is then converted back into the time domain for the side-
channel analysis. The technique is best suited to high resolution 
realignment, such as overcoming oscilloscope acquisition errors. 
Some specific attacks against random clocking CMs have 
been proposed. The wavelet continuous transform of [15] 
introduced a time-frequency analysis, applying it to the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) power traces of a smart card running 
a random clocking CM. A simulated annealing procedure was 
applied to the traces to assist with stretching and compressing 
the individual round patterns to match a chosen reference trace. 
For our randomly merged trace patterns of Figure 2, only a small 
proportion of the trace population would have similar merging 
patterns to a randomly chosen reference, with annealing 
therefore potentially distorting the waveforms significantly. 
The deconvolution of signals was investigated in [16] using 
a smart card with a randomly varying clock between 8 MHz and 
12 MHz. The approach required the development of a comb 
function to define the inter-round boundaries. In the context of 
the randomly merging round patterns of Figure 2, a chosen comb 
pattern will only select the appropriate round peaks for the 
reference upon which the comb is developed. Only a small 
number of the other traces could be expected to match this comb. 
An elastic alignment method was proposed in [17] with an 
optimized variant termed the rapid alignment method in [18]. 
The technique also uses a reference trace, to which the other 
traces are dynamically stretched or compressed. The approach is 
similarly limited, in the context of merged rounds, as discussed. 
We therefore seek an approach that will overcome these issues. 
III. CHARGE AND DECAY PROFILING 
A. Identifying the Rounds of AES 
The waveform patterns of Figure 2 consist of periods of 
processing activity that generate a steep rise in power 
consumption, when a round of AES is being processed, followed 
by periods of inactivity that are characterized by charge decay. 
While it is a relatively straightforward task to identify single 
rounds of processing, in isolation, it becomes a more difficult 
task to interpret patterns where the rounds are processed in close 
proximity and thus a merging of the rounds occurs. 
It was shown in [6] that the peak amplitude of a processing 
round is often sufficient to perform SCA. Therefore the aim is to 
identify the representative peak values of each round in the 
protected waveforms. As a first step we can simplify the 
waveform pattern to remove some of the high frequency noise. 
A 120 MHz digital finite impulse response (FIR) low-pass filter 
was applied to a power trace generated by the countermeasure, 
with the resulting trace shown in Figure 3(a). The trace has been 
zoomed-in to the region of processing for the purposes of clarity. 
 
Figure 3: (a) Visually extracting round information.                                       
(b) Eliminating uncertain rounds via minimum separation metrics. 
A cursory visual inspection of Figure 3(a) enables several 
processing rounds to be identified, and these are annotated with 
a P. However, there remain a few features which are not yet 
certain, highlighted with question marks. When the first 
processing peak P occurs in Figure 3(a), it is followed by a 
smaller decaying peak. Similarly, after the third P, and after the 
last P, a similar pattern occurs. In each case a small amount of 
re-charging occurs, before continuing to decay. Referring back 
to the design of Figure 1, the countermeasure receives an input 
clock, which in the case of our SASEBO-G [10] has been set to 
24 MHz, and generates a randomly delayed phased-offset clock 
to feed the encryption core. The rest of the FPGA is still 
operating off the main 24 MHz system clock, therefore these 
decay features do not relate directly to processing the encryption 
round, but rather to other power consumption activities linked to 
the global clock tree and therefore may be considered as clock-
tree artefacts to be ignored. 
An unknown feature in Figure 3(a) is the question mark just 
before the final P. It would appear that this is a processing 
operation, immediately followed by another operation, burying 
that round’s peak somewhere in the merged round shape. In 
order to determine whether there are merged rounds, it is useful 
to measure the length of time taken to process the two features. 
A useful comparison method is an overlaid clock trace, since this 
provides a pattern with regular spacing and can eliminate peak 
candidates that are too close together. Figure 3(b) shows the 
zoomed-in section of the last round of Figure 3(a), overlaid with 
a 24 MHz clock. Since the separation distance in 3(b) is greater 
than one 1/24 MHz clock period, it is deemed to be a separate 
processing activity and is marked with a P. If it were less than 
one clock period (the minimum possible) it would have been 
interpreted as part of the final round itself. Note that in our 
implementation we have two peaks relating to the initialization 
of the cipher, with the following 10 peaks corresponding to the 
10 rounds of AES. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Attacking the Random Clocking Countermeasure 
A SASEBO-G [10] with VIRTEX-II FPGA was loaded with 
an implementation of AES and the random clocking CM under 
consideration. A set of 500k traces were acquired and filtered 
with a 120 MHz FIR filter to remove high frequency noise. A 
max/min algorithm was then developed to parse through each 
power trace to identify all maxima and minima, as per Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Power trace with all maxima and minima identified. 
The maxima were then evaluated pairwise consecutively to 
determine if a large charging (round processing) feature was 
present. A second pass through the peaks then considered the 
amount of decay relative to the neighboring value to determine 
whether the peak should be considered as a processing round, or 
as a clock-tree artefact. The threshold for this was arbitrarily 
determined to be 30% decay by inspection of several traces. This 
value is implementation specific and would need to be 
determined for any given data set. The merged features were 
then detected using the described minimum separation metric. 
The resulting peak detections are shown in Figure 5, which has 
again been zoomed-in for clarity. 
 
Figure 5: Power trace with AES processing rounds identified. 
As mentioned, the threshold for clock decay was arbitrarily 
chosen and is not ideal for all traces. Consequently, when pre-
processed with the above algorithm, around 60% of the traces 
conformed and generated the required 12 peak pattern. Those 
traces that did not conform were ignored. A CPA attack was 
performed on the 500k trace set, targeting a byte of the register 
transition from the final round to the ciphertext. The attack was 
successful after approximately 30k traces, correctly identifying 
the target key byte value with a distinctly higher correlation 
value, as shown in Figure 6(a). For comparison, and to confirm 
that there was no inherent leakage making the attack successful, 
an integration attack was also performed. As shown in Figure 
6(b), the attack was unsuccessful with a low correlation value. 
 
Figure 6: (a) Successful attack (b) Failed integration attack. 
B. Improving the attack with a Round Separation Metric 
Since the random clocking CM has to provide enough 
variation between the times of round executions to sufficiently 
alter the shape of the waveforms in a random manner, the 
distance between the final two rounds of the algorithm will also 
vary. These variations will reside somewhere within the range 
of the extremes from where no separation is present, to the case 
where a large enough delay is present that the prior round has 
had time to fully decay to background levels. If the data set used 
for the successful correlation attack is now parsed again, but this 
time to only select traces where the penultimate round has had 
sufficient time to decay, then the randomized cumulative 
charging effect can also be minimized, as illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Analyzing the separation metric between the final rounds. 
By progressively increasing the separation distance in the 
partitioning of the data, we can find the optimal distance that 
requires the fewest overall traces. It is apparent in Table 1 that 
the optimal separation distance is approximately 4 clock periods, 
leading to a successful attack with only 13.4 k traces. It might be 
expected that the largest separations would yield the best results, 
however, there are a lower number of traces available from those 
sets, since it requires more original traces to be acquired to 
generate these more extreme trace sets.  
Clock 
Periods 
Traces 
in Set 
Min Required 
for Attack 
Factor for 
Total Traces 
Total 
Traces 
NA 288 k 30 k 1.74 52.2 k 
> 2 113 k 8 k 4.42 35.4 k 
> 3 63 k 8 k 7.84 63.0 k 
> 4 28 k 750 17.86 13.4 k 
> 5 16 k 500 31.25 15.6 k 
> 6 6 k 500 73.33 36.7 k 
Table 1: Analyzing the separation distance between the final rounds. Clock 
distance > 4 gives the best result, requiring only 13.4 k total traces for success. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A new pattern analysis attack against a high frequency 
random clocking CM has been introduced, modelling the rise 
and fall of power consumption of AES round processing 
operations, overcoming both the temporal shifting and 
cumulative charging characteristics of [10] and [11]. While the 
attack parameters are specific to the data set under examination, 
the method can be used to provide a simple characterization of 
the power consumption trace patterns for other devices. The 
attack could be optimized further to better model the 
countermeasure and reduce the number of discarded traces 
(approximately 40% in the demonstrated approach). However, 
this customization effort needs to be traded against the ease with 
which further additional traces may be gathered. This work 
reinforces the view that the random clocking countermeasure 
should not be relied upon in isolation for protection from power 
attacks. Rather, it should be coupled with additional 
countermeasures such as dummy operations and masking. 
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